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NEW YORK ABORTION
REFORM-A CRITIQUE
WILFRED R. CARON *
T HE LAST TWO SESSIONS Of the New York State Legislature
witnessed concerted efforts to enact legislation legalizing abortions
in a wide range of circumstances. The moral and social questions
presented by the legislative proposals were widely publicized in the
various media, but there was a serious lack of public exposition and
analysis of the actual terms of those proposals. The impression
created in the public mind was that the proposed reforms would
limit legal abortions to clearly specified situations.
As a public service, and also out of a desire to communicate
the independent view of a professional segment of the Catholic
laity on the fundamental moral questions, the Queens Chapter of
the Catholic Lawyers Guild of the Diocese of Brooklyn decided
to study and take a position with respect to the principal proposal.
The result of that study was a report of its Committee on Public
Affairs which was adopted, not without dissent, by the membership
of the Guild. A copy of that report was placed in the hands of
numerous public officials in the State of New York, including each
member of the Legislature, prior to consideration of the measure
on the floor of the New York State Assembly. After debate, the
bill was withdrawn by its sponsor.
As President of the Guild and Chairman of the Committee which
prepared the report, I wish to emphasize that the position of the
Guild is not a so-called "Catholic" position. The decision to
oppose is predicated squarely on the numerous and substantial
deficiencies of the bill as a legislative proposal, and upon the
* President, Queens County Chapter, Catholic Lawyers Guild of the Diocese
of Brooklyn.
clear policy it would establish in its prac-
tical effect. Disclaimers to the contrary
notwithstanding, that policy is one of un-
restricted abortional practices by hospitals
and physicians.
You are respectfully urged to give your
careful attention to the report which
follows.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
The Committee on Public Affairs, after
a study of the reports of its two sub-
committees engaged in this work, and
upon its own further analysis and re-
search, made the following report to the
members of the Guild concerning a pro-
posal before the 1968 session of the New
York State Legislature, known as "An
Act to amend the public health law
and the penal law, in relation to justi-
fiable abortion and repealing subdivision
three of section 125.05 of the penal law,
relating thereto" (Senate No. 529; Assem-
bly No. 761). This bill has been com-
monly referred to as the Blumenthal Bill.
RELEVANCE OF CATHOLIC
TEACHING
The Roman Catholic Church teaches
that the direct abortion of an unborn
child, from the time of conception, is
gravely immoral regardless of the justifica-
tion asserted. At the threshold of its
work, therefore, this Committee felt re-
quired to determine whether that teaching,
by itself, mandated the Committee's op-
position to all legislative proposals to
relax criminal sanctions for abortion. In
the course of its deliberations, it con-
sidered all controlling principles, including
these:
1. The natural right of each man to
form his conscience as he compre-
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hends truth, and to act in accord-
ance with conscience free of ex-
ternal coercion.
2. The obligation of each man, in
forming and acting upon his con-
science, not to transgress upon the
just rights of others or to act in-
imically to the public order and the
common good of society.
3. The right and duty of society to
preserve the common good and
public order, both by due recog-
nition of individual freedom and
due enforcement of the individual
responsibility to others, the public
order, and the common good.
4. The teaching authority of the
Roman Catholic Church in rela-
tion to its faithful.
5. The apostolate of the Church and
its members to declare truth and
right norms of morality as these
are revealed and understood.
After extensive discussion of the con-
trolling principles with the Guild's Can-
onical Consultant, this Committee and its
two subcommittees unanimously con-
cluded that Roman Catholic teaching on
the immorality of abortion does not re-
quire them to oppose all proposals to re-
lax the penal laws of this State as they
apply to abortions. The precise issue of
principle relates to the office and pur-
pose of human law, in particular the
penal law, and resolution of that basic
issue will always depend upon consider-
ations of the public order and common
good of society. That view in no manner
or degree detracts from or depreciates the
moral standards which the members of
this Committee hold to be necessary for
themselves as faithful members of their
Church.
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PUBLIC POLICY
The people of the State of New York
have long recognized the life of the un-
born and, to protect that life, have en-
acted laws prohibiting acts intended to
destroy it for any reason except where
necessary to preserve the life of the
mother. As a result of enactments at two
successive legislative sessions,1 the law of
this State in 1846 provided:
§ 1. Every person who shall admin-
ister to any woman pregnant with a quick
child, or prescribe for any such woman
to take any medicine, drug or substance
whatever, or shall use or employ any in-
strument or other means, with intent
thereby to destroy such child, unless the
same shall have been necessary to pre-
serve the life of such mother, shall, in
case the death of such child, or of such
mother be thereby produced, be deemed
guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree.
§ 2. Every person who shall admin-
ister to any pregnant woman, or pre-
scribe for any such woman, or advise or
procure any such woman to take any
medicine, drug, substance or thing what-
ever, or shall use or employ any instru-
ments or other means whatever, with in-
tent thereby to procure the miscarriage
of any such woman, shall, upon convic-
tion, be punished by imprisonment in a
county jail, not less than three months
nor more than one year.
§ 3. Every woman who shall solicit
of any person any medicine, drug, or
substance or thing whatever, and shall
take the same, or shall submit to any
operation, or other means whatever, with
intent thereby to procure a miscarriage,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail, not
less than three months nor more than
1 Laws of New York, 1845, ch.200; 1846, ch.22.
one year, or by a fine
one thousand dollars, or
fine and imprisonment.
not exceeding
by both such
The present Penal Law continues the pol-
icy of these early statutes. It basically re-
gards the commission of an abortional act
as a crime against society, even if com-
mitted by a duly licensed physician or the
female herself. The sections of the Penal
Law which impose criminal sanctions are
so structured that the commission of
crime directly depends upon the statutory
definitions of an "abortional act" and a
"justifiable abortional act." Both these
phrases are defined as follows by the
Penal Law: 2
'Abortional act' means an act com-
mitted upon or with respect to a female,
whether by another person or by the
female, herself, whether she is pregnant
or not, whether directly upon her body
or by the administering, taking or pre-
scription of drugs or in any other man-
ner, with intent to cause a miscarriage of
such female.
'Justifiable abortional act.' An abor-
tional act is justifiable when committed
upon a female by a duly licensed phy-
sician acting under a reasonable belief
that such is necessary to preserve the life
of such female. A pregnant female's com-
mission of an abortional act upon herself
is justifiable when she acts upon the
advice of a duly licensed physician that
such is necessary to preserve her life.
The submission by a female to an abor-
tional act is justifiable when she believes
that it is being committed by a duly
licensed physician, and when she acts
upon the advice of a duly licensed phy-
sician that such is necessary to preserve
her life.
2 Section 125.05 (2) and (3) (emphasis added).
It should be observed that an abortional
act, as defined, does not require that a
miscarriage ensue, but only that the act
be committed with that intent. The sue-
ceeding sections which impose criminal
sanctions depend on the commission of
an "abortional act," and they exclude a
"justifiable abortional act." The crimes
are categorized as manslaughter, abortion
and self-aborion. There is a first and
second degree of each crime.
Manslaughter. The crime of man-
slaughter is committed when the abor-
tional act causes the death of the female.
The second degree of the crime is com-
mitted when the abortional act results in
such death, regardless of whether the
female was pregnant. 3 This is a class C
felony, punishable by an indeterminate
sentence not exceeding fifteen (15) years.4
The crime is elevated to first degree if
the abortional act is performed upon a
female pregnant for more than twenty-
four (24) weeks. 5  This is a class B
felony punishable by an indeterminate
sentence not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years.6 Provision is made in each case
for amelioration of the punishment where
the ends of justice and the public interest
require.7
Abortion. Abortion in the second de-
degree is committed by the mere per-
formance of an abortional act upon a
female, notwithstanding that harm or
death were not caused to her or the un-
born child." This is a class E felony,
punishable by an indeterminate sentence
3 Section 125.15 (2).4 Section 70.00 (2) (c).
5 Section 125.20 (3).
6 Section 70.00 (2)(b).
7Section 70.00 (3)(b).
8 Section 125.40.
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not exceeding four (4) years. 9 The crime
is elevated to first degree if the abortion-
al act is performed upon a female preg-
nant for more than twenty-four (24)
weeks and the act causes the miscarriage
of the female. 10 This is a class D felony,
punishable by an indeterminate sentence
not exceeding seven (7) years." Pro-
vision is made in each case for ameliora-
tion of the punishment when the penalty
prescribed seems unduly harsh in the cir-
cumstances, 2 and in the case of first
degree abortion where the ends of justice
and the public interest require. 3
Self-abortion. Self-abortion in the sec-
ond degree is committed by a female who
performs or submits to an abortional act
upon herself at any time during her
pregnancy, regardless of whether mis-
carriage results. 1'4  This is a class B
misdemeanor, punishable by a definite
sentence not exceeding three (3) months. 15
The crime is elevated to first degree when
the female commits or submits to an
abortional act upon herself after the first
twenty-four (24) weeks of pregnancy
and it causes her miscarriage.' 6 It is a
class A misdemeanor, punishable by a
definite sentence not to exceed one (1)
year.
17
General. Both degrees of man-
slaughter, and the first degrees of abor-
tion and self-abortion, are regarded by
the law as homicide. 18  The provisions
9Section 70.00 (2)(e).
10 Section 125.45.
'J Section 70.00 (2)(d).
"2 Section 70.05.
13 Section 70.00 (3) (b).
14 Section 125.50.
1" Section 70.15 (2).
16 Section 125.55.
17 Section 70.15 (1).
is Section 125.
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noted above for the amelioration of
punishment do not represent special
consideration for the crimes of man-
slaughter and abortion discussed above,
but apply generally to the classes of
felonies in which these crimes are
included. In addition to the foregoing
provisions affecting the immediate parti-
cipants in the abortional act, it is a class
B misdemeanor for one to issue abor-
tional articles. One issues abortional
articles " , . . when he manufactures,
sells or delivers any instrument, article,
medicine, drug or substance with intent
that the same be used in unlawfully pro-
curing the miscarriage of a female." 19
Currency of Public Policy. The pub-
lic policy of this State, as manifested by
these statutes, is not only clear but re-
cently declared. These provisions of the
Penal Law were promulgated as part of
the exhaustive revision of the criminal
law of this State by the State Commission
on Revision of the Penal Law and Crim-
inal Code. That commission was created
upon the recommendation of the Govern-
or in 1961, and its work took four years.
The Revised Penal Law, including the
provisions governing abortions, was en-
acted into law in 1965-to become effec-
tive September 1, 1967. The Governor's
Memorandum of Approval, dated July 20,
1965, noted that the new Penal Law
"reorganizes and modernizes penal pro-
visions proscribing conduct which has
traditionally been considered criminal in
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence." Not only
did the new Penal Law receive over-
whelming legislative and executive ap-
proval, but it was approved by public
bodies and legal, law enforcement and
numerous civic associations.
19 Section 125.60.
Policy Based on Life. The public pol-
icy of this State is premised on a due
recognition by its people of the actual
existence of new life during pregnancy.
The precise nature of that life poses
questions that law is ill-equipped to
determine. But the law does recog-
nize the existence of life at least so proxi-
mate to the complete human nature that
it prohibits acts hostile to its fulfillment
except for the gravest cause. This has
been society's estimate of what is neces-
sary for the common good.
THE BILL
The Bill provides for the legalization
of therapeutic abortions only by duly
licensed physicians, for enumerated rea-
sons beyond the necessity to preserve the
female's life. In the main, its philosophy
is that abortion is essentially a medical
procedure justified by health or social
considerations involving the alleged well-
being of the pregnant woman or the un-
born child. It proposes that all its pro-
visions, including the definition of "justi-
fiable abortion," be incorporated into the
Public Health Law. These factors,
coupled with certain other of the Bill's
features, require that a reasonable analy-
sis of its provisions and their effect be
governed by the rule of liberal construc-
tion.
Hospital Abortion Committee
The Bill contemplates that abortions
will be approved by a hospital abortion
committee whose duty will be to review
applications for abortions. A hospital
abortion committee would consist of not
less than three (3) nor more than five
(5) members of the hospital medical
staff, and is initially required to include
one specialist in obstetrics, one in internal
medicine, and a psychiatrist. If the
hospital medical staff lacks one or more
of these specialists, any physician on the
medical staff would be authorized to
serve if approved by the Department of
Health. 0 If the female's physician is a
member of the abortion committee, he
is excluded from the committee's consid-
eration of her application. 21  Upon ap-
proval of an abortion by a majority of
the hospital abortion committee, for the
reasons stated in the Bill (discussed be-
low), a duly licensed physician and sur-
geon is authorized to perform the abor-
tion in a hospital which certifies its com-
pliance with the procedural requirements
of the Bill to the Department of Health.
22
Although the Bill seems to contemplate
that the abortion be performed in the
same hospital whose abortion committee
approved the abortion,23 there is no ex-
press prohibition against its performance
in a different hospital which also has
certified its compliance.
The Bill provides that the hospital
abortion committee may "approve" an
abortion, but it does not require in terms
that it or any single member shall make
the underlying examination of the preg-
nant woman to determine the actual
existence of the reasons specified by the
Bill as necessary for approval. The def-
inition of "hospital abortion committee"
provides only that the committee "...
shall review cases presented for the per-
formance of a justifiable abortion, in
accordance with the provisions of this
title, and determine in each such case
whether the proposed abortion shall be
20 Section 2590(c).
21 Section 2591(d).
22Sections 2590(b), 2591(d),- 2594 and 2596.
23 Sections 2590(c) and 2594.
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performed in the hospital." 24 The Bill
repeatedly refers to the applicant, but no
provision is made for the form and con-
tent of the application. Nor does the
Bill require that the hospital abortion
committee see or interview the applicant.
Similarly, it does not require that the
pregnant woman's physician appear be-
fore the committee or that his examina-
tion and conclusions be reduced to
writing for presentation to the com-
mittee.
There is no requirement that the hos-
pital abortion committee record substan-
tive findings, but only that the hospital
in which it functions maintain records
"adequate to show that the operations of
its hospital abortion committee comply
with the procedural requirements set forth
in this title."' "5  The section in question
also provides that the hospital ". . . shall
furnish to the department [of Health]
such reports as the department may re-
quire, provided that such reports shall
not include the name of the patient. .. ."
No specific penalty is provided for the
failure to keep records, whatever their
content.
As a result of all the foregoing an
abortion could be approved by a hospital
abortion committee on the strength, for
example, of a mere oral statement by the
female's physician. Whatever might be
the actual practices of such committees,
it is clear that they would not be circum-
scribed by the Bill in any important re-
spect.
24Section 2590(c).
25 Seotion 2597 (emphasis added).
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Bases of Justification
The Bill enumerates the reasons which
would justify the approval of an abortion
by the hospital abortion committee." In
view of the total observations upon the
Bill made by this Committee, it is neces-
sary only to focus on some of the more
notable aspects of the stated reasons for
justification.
Physical and Mental Health. The hos-
pital abortion committee would be author-
ized to approve an abortion for the
reason that:
(1) there is medical evidence of a sub-
stantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would endanger the life of the
pregnant woman; or
(2) there is medical evidence of a
substantial risk that a continuance of the
pregnancy would cause a material im-
pairment of the physical health of the
pregnant woman or would cause her to
become a mentally ill person as defined
in the mental hygiene law; or
(3) there is medical evidence of a sub-
stantial risk that the foetus, if born, will
be permanently and materially physically
impaired or will be a mentally ill per-
son or a mental defective as defined
in the mental hygiene law.
These provisions are manifestly vague,
the problem being compounded by the
qualification of vague terms by vague
terms.
There is no requirement that there be
substantial medical evidence, or that the
risk described be clear. There is no
necessity for imminent impairment. These
provisions do not define "physical health"
as to which there must be the risk of
"material impairment," nor do they define
what is "material." They do not require
2G Section 2590(b).
that the impairment be permanent in the
case of the pregnant woman. This is
manifest by the requirement that there
be a risk of permanent impairment in the
case of the child.
Regarding the justification based on
danger to the life of the mother, the Bill
does not contemplate an immediate threat
to life itself. That is evident from the
subsequent provision which permits abor-
tion by a physician without approval of
a hospital abortion committee where he
believes "in good faith, that: (a) the
life of the pregnant woman is in immi-
nent danger .... ." .. Not only need the
danger not be imminent, but it may even
be remote. The abortion is authorized if
there is "medical evidence of a substan-
tial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would endanger." Because of the
other grounds related to health, vague-
ness here is significant only as to the
period after twenty-four (24) weeks of
pregnancy. An abortion on this ground
may be approved at any time (discussed
below). Does danger to life mean the
threat of loss of life? If that is the in-
tent, it will be defeated by medical inter-
pretation as evidenced by the fact that
under the more restrictive provisions of
the Penal Law abortions are carried out
although the mother's life does not hang
in the balance (discussed below). In
light of these practices, the full scope of
this ground is difficult to measure since
it works a clear extension of the present
Penal Law provision that the abortion be
"necessary to preserve the life" of the
mother. This change in statutory lan-
guage is not without significance. What is
at stake under this provision is the life
27 Section 2592.
of an unborn child up to the time of
delivery.
The incorporation of Mental Hygiene
Law definitions of a "mentally ill person"
or "mental defective" seems ill conceived.
Those definitions were legislatively pre-
scribed in order to serve the present
objects and purposes of the Mental
Hygiene Law. They were not intended
for use in determining when foetal life
should be terminated. It is noted that
the definition of a "mental defective" con-
tained in the Mental Hygiene Law does
not denote a permanent mental incapa-
city.28 In the cited case, the person who
had been institutionalized as a mental
defective became adjusted and was able
to procure and retain permanent employ-
ment. That case also held that the stan-
dard of whether a person is a "mental
defective" is the "incompetency or in-
capacity of managing oneself and one's
affairs." This would seem an impossible
judgment to make in the case of the child.
Insofar as the Bill would justify abor-
tion by reason of the expected mental or
physical impairment of the child, it must
be understood that the risk contemplated
is merely a "statistical" risk, at least in
the overwhelming number of cases.2"
The following report contained in the
cited work (page 65) warrants restate-
ment as an illustration of the problem:
What should be the attitude toward
'so-called' foetal indications for abortion?
The indications that a child will be de-
formed are usually statistical. During the
early months when most abortions are
considered, one can predict deformity
only by prior overall experience and
28 Lee v. State, 187 Misc. 268 (Ct. Cl., 1946).
29 SMITH, ABORTION AND THE LAW, 45-59, 64-67
(1967 ed.).
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not specifically in a given case. For
example, the risk of a defective child in
a mother who develops rubella in the first
trimester of pregnancy is about 20 per
cent; but the risk is 60 per cent if she
develops the disease in the first few weeks
of pregnancy and less than 10 per cent
at twelve weeks of gestation.
In a careful prospective study that fol-
lowed the 227 infants of mothers who
contracted rubella during pregnancy, the
incidence of mental retardation was no
different from that in the general popula-
tion; 92 per cent of the children were
attending regular schools eight to eleven
years after birth. Many of the defects
of these children were correctable. While
these statistics may indicate an overly
optimistic attitude, they represent the best
information available until the figures from
the rubella epidemic in 1964-1965 have
been similarly analyzed.
What is "medical evidence of a substan-
tial risk" in the case of the child?
This ground necessarily postulates that
the law should authorize the termination
of perfectly healthy foetal life in the
course of a highly speculative selective
process. It is noted that this provision,
as drawn, does not depend upon an ad-
verse effect on the mental or physical
health of the mother by reason of the
possible disability of the child.
Rape, Incest, Non-Age and Incapacity.
The hospital abortion commitee would
also be authorized to approve an abor-
tion for the reason that
(4) the pregnancy of the woman re-
sulted from an act of rape in the first
degree or from an act of incest, as de-
fined in the penal law, or the pregnancy
occurred while the female was thirteen
years of age or less; or
(5) the pregnancy of the woman oc-
curred while the woman was declared to
be a mentally disabled or incompetent
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person as defined in the Mental Hygiene
Law.
It is first noted that abortion is author-
ized notwithstanding that the pregnancy
does not result in any adverse effect upon
the mental or physical health of the
mother. The mere fact of pregnancy
would give rise to the right to abort.
The inclusion of incest as justification
raises special questions. The crime of
incest is defined by the Penal Law as
follows:
A person is guilty of incest when he
marries or engages in sexual intercourse
with a person whom he knows to be re-
lated to him, either legitimately or il-
legitimately, as an ancestor, descendant,
brother or sister of either the whole or
the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or
niece.30
The inclusion of this ground permits the
abortion of a perfectly healthy unborn
child in the absence of an unjust trans-
gression upon the female, even where
pregnancy results from the act of consent-
ing adults. Further, if this ground is
intended to avoid the possibility of de-
formity or other deficiency in the child,
it fails of its total purpose when it refers
to the crime of incest as defined in the
Penal Law. The cohabitation of married
persons within most, if not all, the de-
grees of consanguinity stated in the stat-
ute would not constitute a crime where
the marriage was valid in the forum in
which it was contracted.3 1
The allowance of abortion where the
pregnancy occurred while the woman was
declared to be a "mentally disabled" per-
3 0 Section 255.25.
31 1933 Opinions of Attorney General of New
York 83.
son calls into play the definition of that
term by the Mental Hygiene Law, as
follows:
'Mentally disabled' shall mean a per-
son who is mentally ill, mentally defective,
epileptic or otherwise psychiatrically or
neurologically disordered, and who re-
quires care and treatment in a hospital
or institution, or requires the services pro-
vided such a person pursuant to the pro-
visions of this chapter, and 'mental dis-
ability,' 'psychiatric disorder' or 'neuro-
logical disorder' shall mean the conditions
with which the mentally disabled are
afflictedA3
The objection noted above to the use of
Mental Hygiene Law definitions applies
here. The breadth of this definition is
likewise noted.
Under the Bill the hospital abortion
committee would make the determination
that the crime of rape in the first degree
was perpetrated. The competence of
that committee to make the legal judg-
ment required is at least open to grave
doubt. The difficulty is compounded by
reason of the fact that the judgment
would be made solely upon the appli-
cant's uncorroborated sworn written state-
ment of the facts concerning the act,
provided that a copy of that statement
has been filed with the appropriate dis-
trict attorney and that a report of the
rape was made to law enforcement
authorities within seven (7) days after
the act.3 3 The Penal Law wisely provides
that a person shall not be convicted of
rape in the first degree on the uncorrob-
orated testimony of the victim. 3 4  While
the question under the Bill is admittedly
3 Mental Hygiene Law §2(21).
33Section 2591(e).
34Section 130.15.
not the guilt of the perpetrator, never-
theless the law's experience with the un-
reliability of the victim's testimony sug-
gests that the occurrence of the rape be
more satisfactorily established if life is
to depend upon an actual unjust trans-
gression upon the female. The Penal
Law requirement of corroboration also
applies to incest, in which case the Bill
likewise only requires the uncorroborated
sworn written statement of the applicant
(but now adding identification of the per-
petrator), provided that the statement has
been filed with the district attorney.
Time Limitations
The effort to limit the authorization of
an abortion in terms of the stage of preg-
nancy is contained in the section of the
Bill entitled "Procedures" which includes
the following provision:
Except in a case where continuance of
the pregnancy would endanger the life of
the pregnant woman, the hospital abor-
tion committee shall not approve the
performance of a justifiable abortion un-
less it shall find that not more than
twenty-four weeks have passed since the
date of conception.3 5
This provision plainly does not require,
by its terms, that the abortion be per-
formed not later than the twenty-four
(24) weeks after conception, but only
that it shall not be approved there-
after. If it was the intent to prohibit
the performance of abortions after
twenty-four (24) weeks, with the excep-
tion noted, that intent has not been
effected by clear statutory language. If
it was not, then the purpose of the pro-
vision is obscure.
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Even if it were the intent to prohibit
abortions after twenty-four (24) weeks,
with the exception noted, the reason for
that limitation is difficult to perceive. If
it was taken automatically from the fact
that the present crimes of manslaughter,
abortion and self-abortion are increased
to the first degree where committed after
the first twenty-four (24) weeks, 'then it
would seem the limitation was based
upon considerations hardly analogous.
There is an obvious difference between
increasing the degrees of a crime and
authorizing the taking of life. If that
limitation is predicated upon risk to the
mother, it arbitrarily ignores the fact that
an abortion can be successfully performed
after twenty-four (24) weeks-a fact
acknowledged by the Bill itself in case
of danger to the life of the pregnant
woman. If it is based upon the physical
development of the child, it is noted that
foetal movement occurs prior to the
twenty-fourth week.
Consents
The Bill requires initially (see "Judi-
cial Review" below) that the hospital
abortion committee withhold its approval
in the case of minors, married women
and persons declared mentally disabled
or incompetent, unless consent is given
by the parents, guardian, husband or
committee-as may be appropriate to the
given caseY6 The written consent of the
pregnant woman is also required. There
is no requirement that the hospital abor-
tion committee make an independent
finding, based on inquiry, that the con-
sent of the pregnant young girl or woman
was freely given.
36 Section 2591(b).35 Section 2591 (c).
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Judicial Review
The Bill provides for judicial review
by the Supreme Court in cases where the
requisite consent (other than the wo-
man's) is not given or where a hospital
abortion committee fails or refuses to
act on or approve an application for
abortion within ten (10) days after sub-
mission. 7 It provides: "A hearing shall
be held on the petition by the court
within two days after the filing thereof
on due notice to the hospital abortion
committee and to the husband, parent,
guardian or judicial committee, if there
be any, of the pregnant woman" (em-
phasis added). If the court should find,
as the case may be,
(a) that the hospital abortion com-
mittee's failure or refusal to act
or approve, or that failure or re-
fusal to give the requisite consent,
is arbitrary, capricious or un-
reasonable, or
(b) that the requisite consent cannot
be obtained "with due diligence,"
and if it should also find that the per-
formance of the abortion is justifiable
within the terms of the Bill, then the
court would be required to authorize the
abortion.
Among the more notable difficulties
with the provision for judicial review are
these: (a) Where the basis of review is
the lack of requisite consent, why should
the court's judgment on "justifiability"
be substituted for that of the hospital
abortion committee, notwithstanding the
committee's presumed competence and
willingness to review the application on
the merits if the requirement of consent
37 Section 2593.
is excused? (b) Where justification is
predicated upon physical or mental health
considerations, no provision is made with
regard to the nature and quantum of
proof. May the court's judgment rest
solely on the testimony of the woman's
physician? He could not serve on a hos-
pital abortion committee reviewing her
application. (c) In all cases notice must
be given to the hospital abortion com-
mittee and the husband, parent, guardian
or committee "if there be any." Why
should notice be given to the parent of a
competent, unmarried adult female? (d)
Is a husband capricious if he withholds
consent for religious or philosophical
reasons? If so, does he really have rights
in the matter? (e) Does "due notice" to
the hospital abortion committee mean its
members are always indispensable parties
to the proceeding? Should they not be?
(f) Is the non-consenting husband, pa-
rent or guardian afforded sufficient oppor-
tunity to offer expert or other testimony
on the question of justification? What is
"due notice?" (g) This being an ad-
versary proceeding, what are the practical
effects of the right to appellate review?
In the Committee's view the provision
for judicial review requires considerable
re-examination.
Emergencies
The Bill provides:
Emergencies. Nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent a physician from per-
forming a justifiable abortion without com-
plying with the provisions of this title
if the physician shall believe, in good
faith, that:
(a) the life of the pregnant woman is
in imminent danger, and
(b) there is insufficient time to com-
ply with the procedural requirements
hereof.
The physician shall report the perform-
ance of such justifiable abortion to the
hospital abortion committee of the hos-
pital with which such physician is af-
filiated or to the department in such
manner as such hospital or department
may require.- s
If it is intended that this provision shall
be limited to a situation in which there
is a present danger of actual loss of life,
that intent should be more clearly stated
in view of present interpretations of the
Penal Law (discussed below). In the
context of the entire Bill, nothing less
should be suggested. Note is also made
of the fact that the content of the physi-
cian's report is left to the discretion of
the Department of Health or the hospital
with which the physician is affiliated.
No penalty is specifically prescribed for
the failure to report. Finally, this pro-
vision should be specifically related to
another which provides: "The hospital
abortion committee shall meet at a regu-
larly appointed time and place and at
such other times and places as the hospi-
tal shall provide in emergency cases." 39
Criminal Responsibility
The Bill would not repeal the Penal
Law definition of an "abortional act,"
but it would repeal the Penal Law defin-
ition of a "justifiable abortional act" by
substituting a new provision which, in
pertinent part, provides: "An abortional
act is justifiable when performed in ac-
cordance with the provisions" of the
Bill. 40  Particularly in the case of the
hospital abortion committee, whether a
crime was committed might depend there-
38 Section 2592 (emphasis added).
1.0 Section 2591(a) (emphasis added).
4o Section 4 (emphasis added).
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fore upon the vague test of "compliance"
with a host of statutory provisions.
Would exoneration from crime depend
upon literal or merely substantial com-
pliance? Whatever the degree of com-
pliance, must it be with respect to both
the substantive and procedural provisions?
Would a physician, for example, who per-
forms an "emergency" abortion be guilty
of a crime if he failed to file the neces-
sary report?
Performing Physician. The Bill defines
a justifiable abortion thusly:
'Justifiable abortion' means a pro-
cedure for the termination of pregnancy
performed in a hospital' by a licensed
physician and surgeon and approved by
the hospital abortion committee, for the
reason that [enumeration of reasons fol-
lows]. 41
In another section it provides:
Justifiable abortion. A physician and
surgeon licensed to practice in this state
may lawfully perform a justifiable abor-
tion, and other licensed practitioners of
the healing arts and hospital employees
may, as necessary, assist such physician
and surgeon, in a hospital which has com-
plied with the provisions of this title,
if the performance of such abortion has
been approved by the hospital abortion
committee or authorized by court or-
der.42
Except in the emergency situation (and
there doubt abounds), the physician is
plainly exonerated if three conditions are
met, namely, (a) that he is duly licensed,
(b) that the abortion was in fact ap-
proved, and (c) that the abortion take
place in a hospital participating in ac-
41 Section 2590(b).
42 Section 2594.
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cordance with the Bill. Given those
facts, the physician would have performed
the abortion ". . . in accordance with the
provisions" of the Bill. He would be
exonerated notwithstanding that the abor-
tion was approved for unauthorized rea-
sons, or for authorized reasons not
sufficiently supported.
Hospital Abortion Committee. The
question of the criminal responsibility of
the hospital abortion committee requires
close examination of the existing Penal
Law definition of "abortional act" which
bears repetition here:
'Abortional act' means an act com-
mitted upon or with respect to a female,
• . . whether directly upon her body or
by the administering, taking or prescription
of drugs or in any other manner, with
intent to cause a miscarriage of such
female.
The hospital abortion committee merely
approves the abortion. The Bill does
not redefine an "abortional act" so as to
include specifically such act of approval,
and in the context of the revolutionary
proposal of the Bill it would be unreason-
able to interpret the existing definition as
contemplating or including the procedures
of the hospital abortion committee. The
new Penal Law definition of what is
"justifiable," as proposed by the Bill,
depends upon the phrase "abortional act,"
as presently defined, and refers to it when
it provides: "an abortional act is justifi-
able when performed in accordance with
the provisions" of the Bill. When the
Bill speaks of "justifiable abortion," it
refers in terms to the act of the per-
forming physician and surgeon in term-
inating pregnancy.43  The conclusion
4. Sections 2590(b) and 2594 (emphasis
added).
seems inescapable that the hospital
abortion committee would not be sub-
ject to the sanctions of the Penal Law.
But even if these provisions could be
construed as subjecting the hospital abor-
tion committee to criminal sanctions for
abuse, the vague test would be compliance
with a broad statutory scheme. In view
of the context of the entire Bill, and
especially in view of the well-settled con-
stitutional requirement that penal statutes
be certain in their application, the Bill
must be viewed as providing no penal
sanctions for abuses by the hospital abor-
tion committee.
Even if there were clear statutory pro-
visions, imposing criminal responsibility
on the hospital abortion committee in
cases of abuse, the probability of en-
forcement is practically nonexistent in
view of the elusive phrasing of the major
grounds for legal abortion coupled with
the absence of any requirement for the
sufficient recording of the data upon
which the committee acted.
Other Observations
The Bill contains no provision which
would prevent a pregnant woman from
making successive applications for an
abortion to different hospital abortion
committees. There is no requirement
that the applicant be a resident of the
State of New York.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis is not a com-
prehensive statement of all of the Com-
mittee's observations concerning the Bill.
The language, scope and practical effect
of the Bill are such that it was deemed
necessary only to set forth the major
considerations which impelled the Com-
mittee's conclusion.
Quite apart from its policy and objec-
tives, the observations made demonstrate
that the Bill was ill-considered and poorly
drafted. In an area of such obvious and
critical importance, the utmost precision
and care are indispensable. The condi-
tion of the Bill requires a practical assess-
ment of its provisions.
In its present form the Bill, by neces-
sary effect, would eviscerate the essence
of the public policy of this State. Under
the- Bill the law would no longer declare
a value on life as it is manifested and
present in the unborn. The value of
such life would be whatever individuals
might choose to ascribe under the pres-
sures and circumstances of the moment.
A majority of the proposed justifications
for abortion are so loosely and vaguely
phrased that even clear provision for
penalties in the event of non-compliance
would be of doubtful salutary effect.
But the fact that the Bill would effectively
eliminate criminal responsibility for abuse
within its procedural framework literally
insures that the lives of the unborn in
this State would ultimately depend only
upon the choice of individuals for reasons
they deem sufficient. Beyond that, the
Bill would establish this State as a haven
for migratory abortions thereby depriving
other states of their rightful interest in
their unborn children and their own pub-
lic policy. Lest this appraisal of the
practical operation of the Bill seem ex-
treme, the Committee would point out
that even under the existing Penal Law,
abortions are carried out by physicians
for reasons that go far beyond the intent
and plain words of the statute, namely,
where "necessary to preserve the life of
the female." "
44 SMITH, supra note 29.
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If the Bill is intended to accomplish
only limited legalization of abortions for
specific statutory reasons, and otherwise
to preserve the integrity of the Penal
Law in cases of abuse, then it fails of its
purpose by the greatest imaginable de-
gree. If, however, the Bill was drawn
with a view towards accomplishing the
clear practical results noted, then it at-
tempts not only to adjust the public
policy of this State but to import into its
body of law an entirely new policy which
in actual practice would view the lives
of the unborn as outside the scope of
society's legitimate interest and concern.
It proposes a social judgment on life
which is so casual as to be fundamentally
abhorrent and clearly adverse to the
common good of society, if not the pub-
lic order. This Committee cannot per-
ceive of any public necessity or justifica-
tion for unfettered abortional practices
even within the structure of the medical
profession for which the Committee has
the highest regard.
By reason of the numerous and serious
objections to the Bill, the Committee is
of the opinion that it is beyond sufficient
improvement by any reasonable process
of correction or change. It is deficient
in numerous fundamental respects. Any
attempt to re-work its provisions in order
to achieve an enactment at this legislative
session would exalt expedience over the
vital substantive and procedural neces-
sities of the situation.
In the judgment of the Committee
there are certain minimal standards that
must be met by any legislative proposal
for the relaxation of the penal laws of
this State insofar as they govern the mat-
ter of abortion. They are:
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1. Clear description and limitation in
the Penal Law of the grounds of
legalization which permit of the
least possible extension of those
grounds in practice, on the theory
that the public policy of this State
is to be established by the legisla-
ture and not by loose individual
interpretation.
2. Clear provision for criminal sanc-
tions in cases of abuse.
3. Complete procedural provisions that
insure observance of the law and
safeguard the rights and interests of
all interested parties, including so-
ciety.
4. Where a case falls outside the
statutory authority, provision de-
signed to assist pregnant women in
overcoming emotional, social and
other difficulties presented by the
pregnancy, toward the end that
they may give birth in the best
possible mental, physical and social
circumstances.
5. Clear provision to insure against
the use of this State as a base for
migratory abortion.
Such a proposal would present the occa-
sion for direct assessment of the accept-
able limits for legalized abortion mea-
sured by the common good of society.
Regrettably, the carte blanche presented
by this Bill doeg not.
The Committee, therefore, recommend-
ed to the members of the Guild that they
adopt the following resolutions:
RESOLVED, that the Queens County
Chapter, Catholic Lawyers Guild of
the Diocese of Brooklyn (the "Guild")
hereby adopts the report of its Com-
mittee on Public Affairs dated Febru-
ary 28, 1968, relating to a certain bill
introduced at the 1968 session of the
New York State Legislature, known as
"An Act to amend the public health
law and the penal law, in relation to
justifiable abortion and repealing sub-
division three of section 125.05 of the
penal law, relating thereto" (Senate
No. 529-Assembly No. 761);
RESOLVED, that the Guild is opposed
to the passage of the Bill;
RESOLVED, that the President of the
Guild take all reasonable measures to
make known the position of the Guild
to the Legislature and the public.
